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Abstract
For decades, microfinance has been utilized as a tool to reduce global poverty rates. Many communities
become entangled with microfinance institutions (MFIs) with the hope of achieving the financial
independence, security, and empowerment that these institutions promise their clients. This paper
highlights the negative consequences of relying on microfinance institutions to improve the development
status of nations. Specifically, high interest rates attached to microloans, strict loan repayment schedules,
and corrupt microloan officers threaten the safety and increase stress on majority-female microloan
borrowers. MFIs fail in their mission to transform economic and social structures in developing nations.
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The Macro Drawbacks of Microfinance
INTRODUCTION
Microfinance, first introduced in the 1970s and later popularized by Nobel Prize winner
Mohammad Yunus, was once hailed as a “magic-bullet” (Sinclair 2012, xiii) development
solution with the power to “eradicate poverty in a generation” (Bateman 2018, 1). The World
Bank defines microfinance as “attempts to provide financial services to households and microenterprises that are excluded from traditional commercial banking services” (Beck 2015, 3). This
approach to poverty reduction aims to influence economics at the individual level in an attempt
to improve the lives of the poorest populations around the world. The term “financial services”
encompasses a variety of microfinance programs and varies by microfinance institution (MFI).
Some services offered by MFIs in countries of all income levels include but are not limited to:
microcredit, microloans, savings accounts, insurance, digital services, and educational
programming (Sinclair 2012, 22; Kohler 2017). MFIs have grown significantly since the time of
their conception, and the results of studies that scrutinize the success of these programs do not
support the “magic bullet” theory. Instead, MFIs have proven to have little effect on the
reduction of poverty on a global scale (Bateman 2018, 3). On the issue of entrepreneurship, the
influence of microfinance programs does not lead to any significant innovation by households
(Sinclair 2012, 234-235). Furthermore, some of the promises of MFIs, like women’s
empowerment and increased rates of school attendance, have had the opposite of the desired
effects (Moodie 2013, 288; Islam 2013, 56; Lehmann 2010, 1). Microfinance programs present
several challenges when practiced in developing nations, and therefore do not meet their goal of
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providing solutions to ending global poverty by transforming economic and social structures
(“Does Microfinance…” 2015).

HISTORY OF MICROFINANCE
Microfinance institutions have undergone several changes over the past few decades. In
its infancy, most MFIs were facilitated by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that utilized
government subsidies to serve the poorest populations in developing countries (Sinclair 2012,
19). This structure has evolved over time, and today, many MFIs operate under for-profit
business models in which lenders are incentivized to charge borrowers high interest rates
(Bateman 2018, 1). The first modern MFI can be traced back to Yunus’s Grameen Bank,
founded in Bangladesh in 1983 (Sinclair 2012, x). Grameen’s primary goal was to reduce global
poverty by providing small loans to the “unbanked,” introducing the safety net of joint financial
responsibility, and targeting women to transform microeconomics by disrupting traditional
gender norms (Sinclair 2012, ix; Kohler 2017). This paper presents evidence that suggests that
microfinance has not accomplished this goal in the decades of its operation.
Almost fifteen years ago, the United Nations declared 2005 the “Year of Microcredit”
(Sinclair 2013, 10; Beck 2015, 1). More recently, however, microfinance institutions have
transitioned to focus a greater portion of their efforts on micro-savings accounts, insurance, and
educational programming, in addition to microcredit and loans (Kohler 2017). Despite any small
successes MFIs may achieve in the short term on the household level, Bateman and Chang argue
that full trust in microfinance strategies as a magic cure for poverty distracts from other financial
programs that are empirically proven to reduce global poverty on a large scale (Bateman 2009,
8). Instead of serving as a long-term solution, Bateman and Chang compare contemporary MFIs
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to “bad medicine” in that they provide temporary solutions to poor communities that result in
initial benefits for both the borrowers and the lenders involved, but in the long run, are
“gradually debilitating, not curing” to the communities they are meant to serve (Bateman 2009,
30).

HIGH INTEREST RATES OF MICROLOANS
The most obvious problem with the commercialized microfinance model employed in
many developing countries today is the tension that exists between the desire to reduce global
poverty in the “Global South” and the incentive to achieve profitability for microfinance actors
in the “Global North” (Sinclair 2012, 102). In order to cover their high fixed costs and make a
profit, MFIs charge microloan borrowers usurious interest rates, sometimes exceeding 100
percent (Sinclair 2012, 5-6). MFIs justify these high interest rates by touting the expansion of
microfinance made possible by the capital generated from this high-interest standard. For
example, Compartamos, a Mexican MFI, claims that ultra-high interest rates benefit “poor
women clients and the wider local community,” although no evidence of this trend has been
reported (Bateman 2010, 147). Sinclair explains that many MFIs could dramatically reduce
interest rates and still cover operating costs (2012, 185); however, few MFIs are willing to
sacrifice the massive net profits that ultimately benefit distant managers and foreign investors
(2012, xiii).
Despite astronomical interest rates that do not seek to generate any further development
in the communities that microloans are meant to serve, many borrowers agree to the terms and
conditions of these MFIs. Colombo explains that in desperate times, especially when medical
emergencies produce external shocks to families living in poverty, many borrowers are driven to
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take any loans available, no matter the conditions, in order to pay for treatments and feed their
families (2019). Furthermore, many illiterate, innumerate borrowers take out microloans without
the ability to understand the interest rates or schedules of repayment that they commit to with the
stamp of their fingerprint (Sinclair 2012, xvi). The consequences of high interest rates for
borrowing parties are further discussed in Section IV of this paper. The unregulated, profitdriven MFIs are unable to fulfill their economic goal of far-reaching poverty reduction with
standard interest rates amounting to irresponsible percentages.

THE EFFECTS OF MFIS ON WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT
In additional to transforming economic systems, another goal of microfinance is to
transform social structures by giving women borrowers a voice in the household through
increased financial responsibility; however, Moodie reports that microcredit may have the
opposite effect (2013). Microcredit, intended to increase the family’s financial stability by
empowering women to make sound financial decisions that benefit each member of the
household, may actually “exacerbate the condition of peril in which many women already live”
(Moodie 2013, 288). In fact, impoverished women who take out loans feel increased pressure to
abide by strict repayment schedules (Sinclair 2012, 20). These stringent timelines often prompt
women borrowers to take out additional loans in order to repay initial loans in a timely manner.
This system traps borrowers in a structure of debt recycling (Bateman 2010, 58; Colombo 2019),
which can increase their financial burden and, as a result, their levels of stress and dependency
(Moodie 2013). Because the majority (about 78%) of microfinance initiatives target women
(Iskenderian 2013), it is women in impoverished communities who must suffer the consequences
of repayment failure or difficulties in establishing microenterprises. In traditional group lending
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systems, women of the same community hold one another accountable for loan repayment. If one
woman borrower in the group defaults on her microloan, the responsibility of repayment is
transferred to the rest of the women as part of their collective repayment agreement (Sinclair
2012, 19). The prevalence of over indebtedness coupled with the pressure to uphold an
agreement that affects other community members negatively impacts the mental health of
microfinance participants, and in many cases, desperate women are pushed “over the edge”
(Sinclair 2012, 205).
The stress that overwhelms the lives of women borrowers of microcredit in developing
countries has produced tragic consequences. Over several months in late 2010, hundreds of
Indian women from impoverished communities committed suicide as a result of the hardships
inflicted by local MFIs (AP 2012; Sinclair 2012, 128). More recently, The Economist reports
that 170 women borrowers, all clients of MFIs, committed suicide in 2018 (Colombo 2019). A
Sri Lankan central microloan officer detailed his experiences of talking “desperate borrowers out
of killing themselves” (Colombo 2019). These women victims of suicide share a common reality
of over indebtedness and suffering at the hands of threatening, oftentimes predatory,
microfinance payment collectors (Colombo 2019; Sinclair 2012, 207). In Sri Lanka, loan
officers, when unable to extract repayment from borrowers, solicited “sexual favours” in return
for collective leniency (Colombo 2019). Similarly, Sinclair writes that some microloan officers
operating in Indian MFIs have been reported to “ask woman to take up prostitution to be able to
pay their installments” (2012, 205). In addition to the negative consequences experienced by
women after they borrow from MFIs, some sources indicate that microlending by female clients
is not always voluntary in the first place. It is common for men, who traditionally possess
financial authority in the household in many developing countries, to send their wives to apply
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for microcredit in their place, since MFIs are more likely to approve women for microfinance
programs, in accordance with their mission statements of female empowerment (Sinclair 2012,
5). Moodie reports that “it is often men who actually use the loans; they are justified in doing so
by deeply entrenched systems of gender inequality and kinship obligation,” which MFIs do
nothing to address (2013, 289). MFIs establish circumstances in which impoverished women
operate at the mercy of powerful lenders to whom they are indebted. This significant power
imbalance in the microfinance system does not empower women, but rather instills feelings of
hopelessness and desperation among the developing world’s female population, leaving them
vulnerable to widespread corruption and abuse.

SCHOOL ATTENDANCE AND CHILD LABOR
Another social benefit that MFIs claim to deliver is an increase in school attendance
rates. The idea is that once microfinance empowers a woman to be financially self-sufficient, she
will devote her resources to improving the lives of her children by ensuring they go to school
(Bateman 2010, 29). In principle, the education that results from this strategy could help poor
families break the cycle of poverty as future generations attain higher levels of education;
however, in practice, this solution has been proven to be much less transformative. In some
cases, school attendance rates have decreased while rates of child labor—a phenomenon Sinclair
describes as “one of the most taboo topics to bring up in microfinance” (2012, 78)—have
increased (Islam 2013, 56; Lehmann 2010, 1). Using data from a randomized controlled trial
(RCT) conducted in 2003–2006 in rural parts of Ethiopia, researchers found that an increase in
the number of microloans issued to poor communities was associated with an increase in child
labor and a decrease in schooling among teenagers (Tarozzi 2015, 77). Another study using RCT
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methodology that examined a group-lending microcredit program in Hyderabad, India found “no
change in the probability that children or teenagers are enrolled in school” after their parents
became involved in microfinance (Banerjee 2015, 49). Finally, in Islam and Choe’s study of 91
villages in rural Bangladesh, they found that households that participate in MFIs are more likely
to contribute to the problem of child labor. Results of this study also show that MFIs adversely
affected school attendance rates; in particular, the schooling of young girls is compromised more
often than the schooling of their male counterparts (Islam 2011, 48). Sinclair explains that the
results of these studies and several others result from “labor-intensive microenterprises” that
compel many families involved with MFIs to employ their own children instead of sending them
to school each day (2012, 6). The adverse effects of microfinance programs on child
development has the potential to trap families from poor communities in unbreakable cycles of
poverty. This begs the question: are the business models of the microenterprises started by
prospective entrepreneurs who take out microloans worth the sacrifice in human capital?

THE MYTH OF A UNIVERSAL ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT
Another objective of microfinance is to empower poor entrepreneurs to establish small
businesses through access to microcredit that would have been unavailable to them before the
introduction of MFIs (Bateman 2009, 2). The issues that arise from this emphasis on
entrepreneurship as the perfect market-based solution are multifaceted. First, it must be pointed
out that like people living in the “developed” world, not all people born in developing countries
are innate entrepreneurs (Sinclair 2012, 234). A lack of entrepreneurial spirit or drive does not
align with microfinance’s plan for the poor, but this is the reality for some borrowers of
microloans. Moodie notes that the entrepreneurial enterprises that women do undertake “are
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predominantly domestic in nature—reproductive—even when they are sold as goods or services
outside the domain of the household” (2013, 289). Second, borrowers who do establish
successful microenterprises suffer from what Sinclair coins as the “missing middle” (2012, 235).
Successful entrepreneurs in developing countries fall into this gap when the size of their growing
businesses require funding that exceeds the limit of a microloan. In many cases, the regions in
which MFIs operate lack traditional banks with the ability to issue bigger loans. Furthermore,
even if another financial institution was accessible, many of these business owners still would
not possess enough collateral to be approved for a traditional bank loan. Finally, most
microfinance loans are not used for income-generating projects. As previously mentioned, many
borrowers direct their microcredit toward the repayment of other loans and associated interest.
Additionally, a large portion of microcredit finances household consumption. In fact, about 50–
90 percent of all microcredit goes into funding consumption—paying for food, medical
expenses, and retail goods— rather than financing entrepreneurial activity (Bateman 2010, 204;
Sinclair 2012, 78). In central Uganda, for example, where conventional mortgages are rare, about
one fifth of microloans intended for business activity is diverted into housing projects (Kampala
2019). In Sri Lanka, women borrowers intended to invest in sustainable income outlets instead
“buy consumer goods on hire purchase and take loans for coming-of-age ceremonies” (Colombo
2019). Evident by the nature of many microenterprises coupled with the recorded spending
habits of borrowers using microcredit, the belief that poor people can achieve “bottom-up”
development through establishing small businesses with microcredit is a myth. With empirical
evidence to suggest this most basic principle of microfinance does not function as intended when
employed in developing countries, it is clear that MFIs fail their millions of desperate borrowers.
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CONCLUSION
There are piles of empirical evidence that refute the fundamental claims of MFIs,
however, the information presented in this paper highlights cases that support one of the most
important takeaways of microfinance research: MFIs do not provide a definitive solution to the
problem of global poverty by transforming economic and social structures, despite what
Mohammad Yunus promised. Even if supporters of microfinance can show small successes of
MFIs, especially if defending a broader definition of microfinance, Chang and Bateman make a
compelling argument for why microfinance efforts should be diverted to other programs, despite
some short-term benefits (2009). In “The Illusion of Microfinance,” these microfinance critics
argue that emphasis on MFIs as miracle cures for global poverty distract from proven solutions
at the national level (Bateman 2009, 27). International support of MFIs absolves state
governments in developing countries of any responsibility to aid the poor through social welfare
spending (Bateman 2009, 26). The “bottom-up” development model, supported by
Neoliberalism, is based on the illusion that impoverished communities are “empowered” by
access to microcredit to pull themselves out of poverty “by their bootstraps”; in practice,
however, usurious interest rates, child labor, unsustainable microenterprises, over indebtedness,
and other conditions cited in paper demystify which microfinance actors really have the power.
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